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Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative 
Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets*  
 
 
Anu Bradford†     Adam Chilton‡     Christopher Megaw§     Nathaniel Sokol** 
 
August 17, 2018 
 
Abstract. Competition law has proliferated around the world. Due to data limitations, 
however, there is little systematic information about the substance and enforcement of 
these laws. In this paper, we address that problem by introducing two new datasets on 
competition law regimes around the world. First, we introduce the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset, which codes competition laws in 130 jurisdictions between 
1889 to 2010. Second, we introduce the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset, 
which provides data on competition agencies’ resources and activities in 100 jurisdictions 
between 1990 and 2010. These datasets offer the most comprehensive picture of 
competition law yet assembled and provide a new foundation for empirical research on 
the legal regimes used to regulate markets.  
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Competition law is one of the most commonly deployed instruments to regulate 
the operation of markets and is a standard feature of economic policy in developed and 
developing countries alike.1 But as Figure 1 illustrates, this has not always been the case. 
Canada enacted the world’s first modern competition law in 1889, followed by the United 
States a year later.2 From 1900 until the end of WWII, however, only 13 countries adopted 
competition laws. During the cold war, another 28 countries adopted competition laws. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition of many countries to market 
economies, the number of countries with competition laws exploded. Between 1990 and 
2010, 78 countries adopted competition laws. By 2010, our research suggests that 135 
jurisdictions—129 countries and 6 regional organizations—had competition laws. 
 Despite this striking spread of competition law, beyond a few key jurisdictions, 
there is little systematic data on countries’ competition regimes.3 In fact, most cross-
national empirical studies on the nature and effects of competition law have failed to 
account for the remarkable variation in competition regimes around the world and instead 
relied on a binary coding of whether or not any competition law exists on the books. Even 
fewer studies measure the operation of these laws on the ground, including whether they 
are complemented with adequate resources and meaningful enforcement efforts.  
In this paper, we introduce two new datasets that provide a detailed coding of 
competition laws and their enforcement around the world. First, the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset provides detailed coding on competition law provisions from 
131 jurisdictions—126 countries and 5 regional organizations—from the beginning of 
modern competition law until 2010.4 Second, the Comparative Competition Enforcement 
Dataset provides data on enforcement resources and activities for 100 jurisdictions during 
                                                
1 Although this area of law is called antitrust law in the United States, we refer to it as competition law because 
that it is the standard name for the field outside of America and we hope for our datasets to be used by researchers 
from around the world. 
2 Although Canada’s competition law from 1889 is generally considered the first modern competition law, we 
also identified a few earlier competition laws and included them in the dataset. For instance, the dataset includes 
England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1623 and France’s Le Chapelier Law of 1791. 
3 Part II provides a brief review of this literature.  
4 Appendix 1 provides a list of the jurisdictions included in both datasets. 
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the years 1990 to 2010. To our knowledge, these datasets represent the most 
comprehensive effort to collect data on the world’s competition law regimes. Both datasets 
are available for download at www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org. 
 In order to introduce these new resources, this paper explains the processes used 
to collect these datasets, describes their coverage, discusses their limitations, and reports 
several stylized facts about competition law around the world revealed by the data. For 
instance, to highlight the content of the Comparative Competition Law Dataset, we show 
the variance in the policy goals that these laws promulgate; document how countries carve 
out different industries from the scope of these laws; and illustrate how some categories 
of authority granted by competition statutes have grown over time while others have 
waned. To highlight the content of the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset, 
we show how Russia and other former members of the USSR have used competition law 
in a fundamentally different way than other countries; document that, despite the vast 
proliferation of competition law agencies around the world, most enforcement activities 
are carried out by a small number of jurisdictions; and compare the regulation of mergers 
by the United States and the European Union.  
By introducing these datasets, our goal is to make two larger contributions. First, 
these datasets will allow scholars to examine the drivers, diffusion, and impact of these 
laws. We are therefore aiming to elevate the quality of the many empirical research projects 
on international competition law that are currently underway or that will be forthcoming. 
Second, our project provides a template for similar cross-national data collection efforts 
in other areas of the law. While we are aware of a handful of other projects that have 
systematically coded specific aspects of countries’ legal regimes (Elkins, Ginsburg, & 
Melton 2009; Law & Versteeg 2011; Chang, Garoupa, & Martin Wells 2018), we are not 
aware of any existing cross-national datasets that include legal coding and enforcement 
data that compare to this research project in scope and scale. Our hope is that our efforts 
inspire other scholars of comparative law to launch similar studies in other fields. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2, we review prior efforts to collect 
comparative data on competition law. In Part 3, we introduce the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset and document several stylized facts about the regulation of 
competition. In Part 4, we describe the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset 
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and highlight stylized facts about competition enforcement resources and activities around 
the world. In Part 5, we briefly conclude.  
 
II. Prior Data Collection Efforts 
 
Our project is not the first effort to collect data on competition policy around the 
world. Instead, there have been dozens of research projects that have reported at least 
some comparative data on competition law. But although these projects have produced a 
number of important findings and deserve credit for breaking new substantive and 
methodological ground, many of these datasets suffer from important limitations. In 
Appendix 2, we provide a complete list of empirical research in the field of comparative 
competition law of which we are aware,5 but here we briefly summarize the four categories 
of projects that have reported such comparative competition law data.  
The first, and most common, data collection category is a binary coding of whether 
competition law exists or not in any given country in any given year. For example, Kee & 
Hoekman (2007), Petersen (2013), and Gutmann & Voigt (2014) all simply code countries 
that have a competition law as “1” and countries without as “0.”6 Although a binary 
variable for the presence of a competition law regime may be appropriate for some 
applications, this type of data is obviously limited by not accounting for variation in the 
nature of countries’ competition laws or the intensity of their enforcement. This is 
problematic for many applications because there is tremendous variation in the content of 
competition laws across countries and over time.  
Second, a handful of datasets go beyond a binary measure and capture some of the 
nuances in the competition laws that countries have adopted. These datasets code whether 
countries have specific provisions in their competition law. For instance, Hylton & Deng 
                                                
5  For Appendix 2, we tried to identify comparative empirical studies that introduce original measures of 
competition law or policy in more than one country, and exclude studies that rely on existing as opposed to 
original data. In addition to empirical studies that seek to measure laws and their enforcement, other empirical 
studies have focused on measuring competition as such (e.g., Aghion et al. 2005). These studies typically rely on 
data such as industry concentration ratios, price markups, or the Lerner index that measures a firm’s market 
power. Although these studies are relevant to research on competition, we do not review them or include them 
in Appendix 2. 
6 To be more specific, Kee & Hoekman (2007) collect more detailed enforcement data for a single year, 2000, 
but rely on a dummy variable in their analyses after noting that “there is no comprehensive data base that indexes 
cross-country differences in competition law enforcement over our sample period.” 
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(2007) and Nicholson (2008) developed indices that identify the presence or absence of 
various types of provisions governing, for example, merger regulation, the prohibition of 
anticompetitive agreements, or abuse of dominance. Notably, Hylton & Deng (2007) use 
their data to develop a 30-point index of the overall scope and stringency of national 
competition laws.7 The trade-off when producing this more detailed coding, however, has 
been having a limited number of countries or years coded. For instance, Nicholson (2008) 
provides data on 52 countries for just the year 2003, and Hylton & Deng (2007) provide 
data on 102 countries for only the years 2001-2004.  
Third, a few data collection efforts measure competition enforcement resources 
and activity. For instance, Clougherty (2010) used data on enforcement budgets to exam 
trends in competition policy and economic growth. Additionally, the Global Competition 
Review (“GCR”) is an annual commercial publication that ranks competition agencies 
largely based on their quantitative enforcement record.8 Similarly, the World Economic 
Forum surveys companies actively competing in a market to try and capture countries’ 
overall enforcement efforts based on their “perceived effectiveness of competition 
policy.”9 These datasets also are limited in their availability, coverage, and reliability. For 
example, the GCR database is typically unavailable for public use, the data is limited to a 
relatively small number of OECD countries for many years, and our research suggests that 
the data is often unreliable.  
Fourth, a few projects have collected a broad range of information on countries’ 
laws, enforcement resources and activities, and institutional features to develop a 
composite index of competition policy. For instance, Voigt (2009) constructed a set of 
indicators that reflect both the content of competition laws—including the extent to which 
these laws reflect an economic approach—and institutional features such as agency 
                                                
7  The Scope Index is available at the “AntitrustWorldWiki”, available at 
<http://www.antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Main_Page> (last visited August 13, 2018). For 
an example of research relying on these indices, see Ma (2011).  
8 GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018). For an 
example of academic research that has relied on the Global Competition Review data, see McCloughan, Lyons, 
& Batt (2007).  
9 The Global Competitiveness Report, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-
global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). For examples of academic research that has 
relied on the World Economic Forum data, see Krakowski (2005) and Sama (2013).  
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independence. And perhaps most notably, Buccirossi et al. (2011) developed a composite 
index that measures a range of features of competition laws, including the size of sanctions 
available and the expected probability of detection. Given the breadth of their coverage, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, these datasets have extremely limited coverage. Buccirossi et al. 
(2011), for example, covers the years 1995-2005 for 13 OECD jurisdictions where data 
were available.10 In other words, they were only able to obtain detailed information from 
a handful of the worlds’ most advanced economies.  
 Although our datasets have their own limitations, we have sought to go beyond 
existing datasets by increasing the number of jurisdictions, years, and the variables covered. 
Importantly, we have separately collected datasets on competition laws and actual 
enforcement resources and activity. We discuss these datasets in detail in the next two 
sections.  
 
III. Comparative Competition Law Dataset 
 
We now turn to introducing the first of the two new datasets: the Comparative 
Competition Laws Dataset. First, we explain our process for collecting the data. Second, 
we explain the coverage of the dataset across countries and over time, as well as the 
categories of variables that it includes. Third, we discuss the limitations of our data 
collection efforts. Finally, we use the data to document new stylized facts about the goals, 
exceptions, and authority contained in competition laws around the world.  
 
A. Collection Process 
 
The data collection was carried out over the course of six years with the help of 
over 70 Columbia Law School students. The research team primarily comprised foreign 
trained law students with relevant legal education and language skills because they brought 
relevant local and regional knowledge to the project and made it possible to retrieve and 
code laws that were not available in English.  
The process of collecting the data entailed multiple steps. When we began the data 
collection back in 2011, we first identified all the jurisdictions that had adopted a 
                                                
10 Voigt (2009) provides data from 1990-2000 for 58 countries, but for a narrow range of variables.  
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competition law by 2010—the year prior to when our data collection effort started. We 
also chose the year 2010 as the end point to ensure that we could reliably identify and 
obtain copies of competition laws that had been passed around the world, and also verify 
if those laws subsequently entered into force. 
For each of these jurisdictions, the research team identified and collected the entire 
universe of relevant laws that had been passed dating back to each jurisdiction’s first 
competition law. This included general competition laws, relevant sector specific 
regulations, and other laws—like criminal laws or constitutions—that contained 
provisions regulating market competition. For example, for the United States, we collected 
every relevant federal law since the passage of the Sherman Act of 1890.  
After gathering all of the competition laws, our research teams performed the 
actual coding of the relevant statutory provisions. To do so, they completed a survey 
hosted on Qualtrics.com for each law. This survey had 171 entry fields. These fields started 
with basic identifying information—such as country, law name, year passed, and year 
enacted—and then proceeded through questions related to substantive statutory 
provisions. To develop this survey, we built on the efforts of Nicholson (2008) and Hylton 
& Deng (2007) and asked questions covering the variables included in their studies. 
However, we also included several new questions. 
Each jurisdiction was assigned to two research team members for independent 
coding. 11  Both followed identical procedures. 12  Importantly, the team members were 
instructed to code the “competition law regime” in force in any given year, which means 
that we layered together all the old and new laws in force in any given year to capture the 
entire set of laws in force at a point in time. A more experienced student was employed as 
a senior coder whose task was to offer guidance on ambiguous or complicated provisions. 
We further reviewed this guidance. Once two team members completed a country’s 
coding, the project leader retrieved the data from Qualtrics.com to prepare for a 
                                                
11 While our goal was to double blind code every law, the laws of five jurisdictions were reviewed by just one 
coder with the assistance of the senior coder due to language restrictions. 
12 When proceeding through each section of the survey, the coder was asked to provide yes-or-no responses to 
a series of questions regarding the existence of specific provisions related to that category. After providing a yes-
or-no response, the coder copied the actual, relevant statutory text from the laws of the country to write-in fields 
that followed each question. 
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discrepancy review. The discrepancy review was then assigned to a third coder, who 
examined all fields for which the two team members provided differing responses, checked 
the actual text of the underlying law, and selected the most accurate answer.13 The output 
of the discrepancy review produced a final “consensus” response to every field for every 
law. Finally, the data was converted to a country-year format to facilitate easy use by 
researchers.  
 
B. Coverage  
 
Figure 2 shows the number of jurisdictions and laws covered in the dataset over 
time. Our research suggests that 135 jurisdictions, including all 34 OECD countries, had 
a domestic competition law by 2010. Six of those jurisdictions consist of regional 
organizations, including the EU, which exercise supranational competition jurisdiction 
over their member states. Of the 135 jurisdictions, we have complete coding of 131—126 
countries and 5 regional organizations. Since many jurisdictions have multiple laws, we 
coded 700 laws in total.14  
Figure 3 depicts the six primary categories of variables that we coded for each 
competition law. First, we coded a series of variables that capture any policy goals 
embedded in a country’s competition laws, including whether the law specifically states 
goals such as improving consumer welfare, efficiency, or social policy. Second, we coded 
whether the law notes either an exemption or whether the law is sector specific. For 
instance, we coded whether the law exempts state owned enterprises or export cartels, and 
whether the law was specific to industries such as energy, telecom, or transportation. Third, 
we coded a series of variables that capture the authority granted by the law in the regulation 
of competition. This includes whether there is a private right of action, the possibility of 
fines or imprisonment for violation, or extraterritorial application. Fourth, we coded a 
                                                
13 The third coders were directed to provide a comment for each field in which they resolved a discrepancy, 
explaining the reasoning behind their choice and pointing to the statutory language that supported their decision. 
As during the first and second coding, the senior coder and we were frequently called upon to assist the third 
coder performing the discrepancy review and ensure uniformity of interpretation across countries. 
14 In two cases—the Dominican Republican and Botswana—the laws were passed prior to 2010, but did not go 
into effect until after 2010. Although we still coded these laws and include them in the totals reported in Figure 
2, these countries may not be included in various analyses that focus on laws in effect. 
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number of variables about countries’ merger control regimes, such as whether merger 
notification is mandatory or if efficiency defenses are allowed. Fifth, we coded variables 
about the regulation of anti-competitive agreements, and, sixth, we coded variables about 
the regulation of abuse of dominance. For each of the six categories, we attempted to code 
variables that captured all relevant features of that competition policy. Taken together, 
these variables provide a detailed picture of competition regimes from countries’ first 
adoption of a competition law through 2010. For scholars interested in using this data as 
a single variable, we have also created a composite index called the “Competition Law 
Index” that draws on many of these variables to create a single picture of the regulatory 
risk posed by countries’ competition regimes in each year from 1890 to 2010 (see Bradford 
& Chilton 2018).  
 
C. Limitations  
 
 While the coverage of our dataset far exceeds prior data collection efforts, it is not 
complete. Thanks to our access to foreign law students, we were able to code laws in 
Arabic, Armenian, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Finnish, German, 
Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish, 
Swedish, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, and Russian. But there were three countries and 
one regional organization where language barriers or lack of access to the legal text have 
prevented us from completing their coding: ASEAN, Djibouti, Faroe Islands, and Iran. 
Additionally, there are some countries included in the dataset where we coded some 
competition laws, but we could not locate all the laws that we believe may exist. Those 
potentially incomplete countries are: Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal.15  
An additional potential limitation of our dataset is that we only coded competition 
statutes and not case law. For those most familiar with American antitrust law, this may 
seem like an important omission. However, a recent expert survey we conducted suggests 
there are few countries outside the United States—primarily common law jurisdictions—
where courts play a significant role in creating new competition law.16 One of the questions 
                                                
15 The dataset includes indicator variables for country-years that have either missing or incomplete coding.  
16 To better understand the role of courts, agencies, and private parties in the administration of antitrust law, we 
developed a short survey that we sent to competition law practitioners and scholars around the world. More 
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in the survey asked: “In practice, do the courts generate new law by changing the scope of 
the antitrust statutes in [insert country]? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no role) to 5 
(extensive role).” Of the 86 countries from which we received survey responses, in only 
11 jurisdictions did the respondents say that “courts play an extensive role” i.e., “courts 
have the power to change the scope of antitrust law and frequently do so.” In a further 4 
jurisdictions, the experts described the role of courts as “large” i.e., “courts have the power 
to change the scope of antitrust statues and sometimes do so.” Thus, while limited to 
competition statutes, this dataset captures the vast majority of competition laws in the 
world and serves as an accurate proxy of the state of competition law in each country.  
 
D. Stylized Facts About Competition Laws Around the World 
 
 To highlight the richness of this dataset, we will briefly examine the variance 
around the world in three aspects of competition law: (1) the goals countries stipulate for 
their competition law; (2) the industries that are exempted from coverage by competition 
law; and (3) trends in the authority granted to agencies and private parties to enforce 
competition law.  
 
1. The Goals of Competition Laws 
 
The promulgated goals of competition law convey important information about 
the political, economic, and ideological commitments underlying its enactment. The goals 
also often reveal what jurisdictions’ enforcement priorities are and how they are likely to 
interpret the substantive commitments embedded in the law. There is considerable 
variance in these goals across countries. The United States and the European Union are 
perhaps the most well-known illustration of this point. Historically, the United States’ 
competition law was aimed at curtailing the concentration of economic and political 
power, reflecting the fear that unfettered economic combination posed a threat to the 
American economy, democracy, and society (Areeda, Kaplow, & Edlin 2013, at 35). 
However, at least since the 1970s, the United States has endorsed the view that 
                                                
specifically, we sent the survey to our professional network, contacts we had made while collecting the datasets 
introduced in this paper, attendees of international competition law conferences, and members of the Academic 
Society of Competition Law (ASCOLA). In total, 166 experts form 86 countries completed our survey. 
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competition law should focus on the narrow pursuit of efficiency, which is typically 
understood as maximization of consumer welfare (Orbacj 2011). The European Union, in 
contrast, has always employed competition law for a greater variety of goals, including 
fostering European integration (Fox 1997, at 340), even if consumer welfare remains its 
primary objective. Moving beyond the United States and the European Union, although 
some existing studies suggest that countries pursue a wide range of policy goals with their 
domestic competition laws (Waked 2015), the topic has not been explored with data as 
comprehensive as in our new dataset.   
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the share of jurisdictions with a competition law that 
have at least one of the eight goals we identified in Figure 3 from 1890 to 2010, and Panel 
B plots the share of jurisdictions with a competition law with each of those eight goals in 
2010. As Panel A shows, explicit goals have become more common over time. In 1950, 
just 8% of jurisdictions with a competition law had one of the eight goals for their 
competition regimes, but 64% of jurisdictions with a competition law did by 2010. Panel 
B shows that although efficiency is considered to be a common goal of competition law, 
in 2010 it is still explicitly identified by only 31% of the jurisdictions. Consumer welfare is 
the most common goal of competition law and found in 40% of the jurisdictions. Beyond 
these two goals, the other six goals we coded are less common. These goals range in 
prevalence from development (in 15% of jurisdictions) to protecting exports (in 2% of 
jurisdictions).  
 
2. Limits in the Scope of Competition Laws 
 
Countries commonly carve out certain industries or enterprise types from the 
scope of their competition law. Our data shows that between 1950 and 2010, roughly two-
thirds of jurisdictions (68%) had at least one exemption in their laws in a given year.17 
These exemptions are not only prevalent but also significant, both in terms of their 
economic and political impact. Often, they tell an important story about the political 
economy underlying a law, indicating which companies or industries enjoy special 
                                                
17 More specifically, 59% of jurisdictions had an exemption in 1950, 70% in 1987, and the number has stayed 
roughly stable since. For instance, 72% of jurisdictions had at least one exemption in 2010.  
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privileges or protection by their governments. It is plausible, even likely, that countries use 
exemptions as a way to shield certain industries or enterprise types from competition law 
and hence give them an edge over their competitors in the marketplace. Alternatively, an 
exemption may reflect the government’s view that certain enterprise types should instead 
be subjected to sector-specific regulations, by which its idiosyncratic characteristics can be 
better addressed. Our dataset offers the opportunity to systematically examine the types 
of industries and firms that governments treat differently by exempting them from 
competition scrutiny, and study how those exemptions differ across time and jurisdiction. 
To illustrate the data, Figure 5 graphs the share of jurisdictions with a competition 
law that either completely or partially exempts different industries. Like Figure 4, Panel A 
shows the number of jurisdictions with a competition law that partially or completely 
exempts at least one industry from 1890 to 2010, and Panel B shows the share of 
jurisdictions that exempt specific industries in 2010. Panel A reveals that roughly half of 
jurisdictions (49%) with a competition law include at least one partial or complete industry 
exemption, and Panel B shows that Agriculture, Transportation, Insurance, Banking, and 
Fishing are commonly exempted industries in 2010.  
 
3. Authority to Enforce Competition Law 
  
In addition to exploring the goals and exemptions listed in competition laws, our 
data also makes it possible to explore the substantive provisions of regimes around the 
world. To illustrate the possibilities, we next explore the variance in the enforcement 
authority provided in competition laws. By authority, we refer to the provisions that 
determine which parties can challenge alleged anticompetitive behavior and the types of 
remedies that can be imposed if a violation is found. For instance, is there a private right 
of action to allow private parties to bring competition cases? Are violations of the law 
punishable with fines or prison time? Does the law apply extraterritorially?  
 Figure 6 displays the trends from 1950 to 2010 for each of the six authority 
variables listed in Figure 3. For each variable, the plots show the absolute number of 
jurisdictions (displayed on the left-hand y-axis) and the share of jurisdictions (displayed on 
the right-hand y-axis) with a competition law that have each provision. Unsurprisingly, 
given the huge increase in the number of jurisdictions with a competition law during this 
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period, the absolute number of jurisdictions that have each authority provision in their 
competition law has increased over time for all six variables. For instance, in 1950 just 6 
jurisdictions had a private right of action in their competition law, but by 2010 that number 
had increased to 71. What is more revealing, however, is the differences in the share of 
jurisdictions that have each authority provision. Although the share of jurisdictions that 
provide for Private Rights of Actions, Divestures, Damages, and Extraterritoriality have 
all notably increased, the share of jurisdictions with provisions allowing for Fines and 
Imprisonment for violations of competition laws has not. Instead, although they both were 
equally common in 1950 (both remedies were found in 90% of competition laws in 1950) 
these two remedies have spread in very different ways. More specifically, the share of 
jurisdictions with Fines has stayed flat (98% of jurisdictions allow for fines in 2010), but 
the share of jurisdictions that allow for prison sentences has declined dramatically (35% of 
jurisdictions allowed for prison sentences in 2010). Notably, the availability of prison 
sentences is a distinctive feature of American antitrust law, and our dataset reveals that this 
provision has not diffused around the world.  
 
IV. Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset 
 
Although there are many more trends that can be explored in the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset, we now turn to introducing our second dataset: the 
Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset. First, we again begin by explaining the 
process we used to collect the data. Second, we summarize the countries and years covered 
by the dataset, as well as the variables it contains. Third, we discuss limitations of the 
dataset. Finally, we use the data to document three stylized facts about the enforcement of 
competition law around the world. 
 
A. Collection Process 
 
The process of collecting the enforcement data entailed multiple steps. We first 
determined the precise variables that we would use to capture the agencies’ enforcement 
resources and activity. This determination was made based on a broad yet preliminary 
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review of the extent and the type of data that agencies make available.18 After determining 
the nature and scope of the data we wanted to collect, we trained and managed over 40 
law students from Columbia Law School and the University of Chicago Law School to 
carry out the data collection process over a period of five years. As with the team we 
assembled to code the Comparative Competition Law Dataset, we recruited students from 
a broad range of countries with relevant language skills and legal expertise.  
We then identified jurisdictions with competition agencies in place between 1990 
and 2010. For the agencies we identified, our research team first reviewed all publicly 
available information on enforcement resources and activities. This entailed conducting a 
detailed review of competition agency websites and annual reports, databases such as 
GCR19 or “Getting the Deal Through,”20 and studies and research reports by organizations 
such as the OECD or UNCTAD. When these diverse sources provided conflicting data, 
we more heavily weighted data provided in the agencies’ annual reports. Most agencies 
made some information on their resources or activities publicly available, but the extent 
varied from very limited in the case of many non-OECD countries to quite comprehensive 
in the case of a subset of established competition law jurisdictions. 
After this review of publicly available information, we drafted questionnaires that 
were individually tailored for each agency. That is, for any given agency, we developed a 
questionnaire that focused only on information that we had not found in the public 
domain or where the publicly available information was conflicting. We first contacted the 
agencies by email in English. If this did not elicit a response, the correspondence took 
place in Spanish, French, Russian, and Arabic, as needed. We typically contacted the agency 
following an introduction by a personal contact within the agency, international 
competition law bar, international legal academia, or an organization such as the 
UNCTAD or ICN. These introductions, together with the contacts of foreign students at 
Columbia and Chicago back in their home jurisdictions, were crucial in persuading the 
agencies to share the data with us. To obtain the needed data for Australia, India, and the 
                                                
18 Special thanks to Keira Campbell who was central in helping us determine the particular variables that were 
most important and at the same time feasible to collect. 
19 GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018).  
20 GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, https://gettingthedealthrough.com/ (last visited March 7, 2018).  
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United Kingdom, we relied on formal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, while 
continuing to benefit from proactive cooperation by government officials. 
Most of the agencies we contacted responded with additional information—some 
responded within day, while others responded after several requests over multiple years. 
Where possible, we attempted to further verify the data provided to us by agencies through 
comparison to our public sources. For example, we used the data we separately assembled 
on competition statutes to confirm whether missing enforcement data reflected a lack of 
authority to engage in certain enforcement activity or simple unavailability of data. For 
some jurisdictions, we also conducted extensive review of individual enforcement 
decisions to assemble additional data that the agencies did not otherwise have readily 
available.21 After these steps, research assistants entered the responses to the questions 
into the master dataset. As a final step, one of us further verified the entries into the master 
dataset as part of a final review of the data. 
 
B. Coverage  
 
We attempted to collect data on all 116 jurisdictions that our research identified as 
having established a dedicated competition agency by 2010. In the end, we managed to 
obtain some data—whether on resources or activity or both—from 112 agencies 
representing 100 jurisdictions.22 While 103 individual agencies cooperated with us, we 
relied solely on publicly available information for the remaining 9 agencies, as we could 
not elicit a response from them. In 10 of the countries in our dataset, enforcement has 
been carried out by more than one agency.23 For these multi-agency countries, we have 
                                                
21  This included some developing jurisdictions such as Venezuela, but it also included some established 
jurisdictions like Austria, the European Union, and South Africa. 
22 In addition to the countries with competition agencies in our dataset, we collected data for three regional 
organizations—the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), and the European Union (EU)—that exercise supranational competition jurisdiction over several 
countries. It is worth noting that there are at least five other regional organizations that have some degree of 
supranational competition policy: Andean Community (CAN), East African Community (EAC), Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). However, the agencies for EAC and ECOWAS were established 
after 2010 (the cut off for our data collection efforts), and we were unable to obtain data from the CAN, the 
EFTA, and the WAEMU.  
23 The countries with more than one agency in our dataset are: Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Luxembourg, 
South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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recorded the resources and activities for each agency separately but combined them in the 
analysis based on our case-by-case review of their (at times complementary and at other 
times overlapping) enforcement powers.24  
We attempted to gather data for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000-2010 (although we 
accepted whatever data agencies gave us, even if it was from, for example, 1994 or 1998). 
We decided to try to collect data starting in 1990 for two reasons. First, the early 1990s 
marked the beginning of a new era in competition enforcement when competition regimes 
started to proliferate dramatically, including outside the OECD countries. Second, our 
preliminary inquiries suggested that only a limited number of agencies could provide any 
reliable data for any years prior to 1990. For many agencies, the data for 1990 or 1995 was 
also sparsely available. If the agency was established after 1990, the first year of the agency’s 
operation marks the first year of data gathering for that country. For instance, for Albania, 
which established its agency in 2004, we have data for 2004-2010.  
Figure 7 illustrates the availability of data over the relevant years. For the year 1990, 
we managed to obtain some data for 15 jurisdictions. We obtained data for an increasing 
number of jurisdictions for the subsequent years: 38 jurisdictions provided some data for 
1995, 63 for 2000, 81 for 2005, and 97 for 2010. It is also worth noting that Figure 7 
reports the number of jurisdictions that provided some data in a given year and not the 
number of jurisdictions that provided complete data. Some jurisdictions were able to 
provide some information for a given year—for instance, their competition agency’s 
budget—but were not able to provide other information we requested—for instance, the 
number of dominance investigations completed with a remedy. 
Figure 8 depicts the primary 17 variables we collected that measure either the 
resources the jurisdictions dedicated to competition law enforcement or the actual 
enforcement activities.25 To measure the enforcement resources, we assembled data on the 
                                                
24 We learned that many countries have gone through several changes in their competition institutions over the 
years. In our dataset, we record the first year when a dedicated competition agency was established or when an 
established agency first gained powers to enforce competition laws. Thus, a country could have had some 
competition enforcement take place prior to establishing a dedicated competition agency if, for instance, another 
Ministry (often trade or some other ministry responsible for commercial affairs) engaged in some prior 
enforcement activity.  
25 Although we tried to collect the same 17 variables for each jurisdiction for each relevant year, not all agencies 
provided all variables for all relevant years. In addition, some agencies provided additional or slight variations of 
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competition agency budgets and the number of agency staff members. To measure 
enforcement activity, we gathered data on the three main anticompetitive activities that 
competition agencies regulate: Merger Control, Anticompetitive Agreements, and Abuse 
of Dominance. For Merger Control, we collected annual data on the number of mergers 
notified to the agency, the number of mergers that proceeded to second stage review, the 
number of mergers resolved with conditional clearance,26 the number mergers blocked, 
and the number of mergers that were withdrawn. For Anticompetitive Agreements, we 
collected annual data on the number of cartel investigations an agency opened, the average 
duration of its cartel investigations, the number of cartel investigations it closed with a fine 
or other remedy, and the total/average amount of cartel fines it imposed. For countries 
that provide for criminal remedies, we further collected annual data on the number of 
cases where criminal remedies were sought and the number of cases where criminal 
remedies were imposed. Finally, for Abuse of Dominance, we compiled annual data on 
the number of dominance investigations an agency opened, the average duration of its 
dominance investigations, and the number of dominance investigations it closed with a 




Like with the Comparative Competition Laws Dataset, our enforcement data has 
limitations. First, as discussed in Part 4.2, despite trying to thoroughly comb public records 
and directly communicate with enforcement agencies, there are several jurisdictions from 
which we did not receive data, and other jurisdictions where the data we received was 
incomplete. Second, this dataset only captures public enforcement, which leaves aside any 
private enforcement activity. This omission again seems most significant for the United 
States. This is confirmed by our expert survey, in which we also inquired about the 
                                                
these standard variables if our requested metrics were not available. Thus, in the end, our dataset consists of 41 
additional variables that are available for a limited number of jurisdictions.  
26 By mergers resolved with conditional clearance, we refer to mergers that are approved subject to commitments 
or conditions, such as behavioral or structural remedies. In some jurisdictions, these conditional clearances are 
known as negotiated settlements. It is also worth noting that the breakdown of the variables we collect for merger 
control is similar to Seldeslachts et al. (2009). 
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significance of the private enforcement in each jurisdiction’s competition law regime.27 
The survey specifically asked: “In practice, how important a role do private parties play in 
enforcing antitrust law in [insert country]? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no role) to 5 
(extensive role).” In the survey responses, the United States was the only country to receive 
a score of 5.28 Thus, while the data we collected is limited to public enforcement, we 
believe it captures the vast majority of competition law enforcement activity in the world. 
Third, our data does not capture broader institutional features of competition law regimes. 
Although we recognize that institutional arrangements—including governance structures 
and management culture—can reveal important aspects of the actual operation of the law 
and influence the overall de facto stringency of the competition law regime, these features 
were not included as part of this data collection effort. 
 
D. Stylized Facts About Competition Enforcement Around the World 
 
 To demonstrate some of the features of these data, we now turn to documenting 
a few stylized facts about enforcement activity. In what follows, we introduce the data by 
reporting raw numbers on enforcement activities and resources. Simply looking at raw 
numbers, however, may mask the actual enforcement of competition law across 
jurisdictions. For instance, meaningful comparisons of budgets need to account for the 
size of countries’ economies. It may also be a mistake to conclude that the number of 
investigations is a reliable proxy for the strength of an antitrust regime. Some regimes may 
achieve deterrence without having to open investigations, while other regimes may only 
investigate a fraction of actual violations. That said, to illustrate these data, we examine: 
(1) the extensive use of competition investigations by Russia and other former members 
of the USSR; (2) the countries that have devoted the most resources to competition 
enforcement and had the most investigations; and (3) the merger review activity of the 
United States and the European Union. 
 
                                                
27 For more information on the survey, see supra note 16.  
28  The experts in just four further jurisdictions responded that “private parties play a large role.” These 
jurisdictions were Germany, Jordan, Slovenia, and Spain. In the other 64 countries we surveyed, the experts 
described the role of the private antitrust enforcement as “insignificant,” “limited,” or “inexistent” in their 
jurisdiction.  
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1. Competition Law Enforcement by Russia and Former Members of the USSR 
 
Perhaps the most striking trend in the enforcement data we collected is the 
staggering number of investigations conducted by Russia and the members (and associate 
members) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (“CIS”).29 Although the former 
members of the USSR that never joined the CIS—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have 
enforcement patterns that are similar to the median agencies in the dataset, the members 
of the CIS are dramatic outliers. To illustrate this, Figure 9 presents data on competition 
enforcement resources and activities while breaking out CIS members from the other 
countries in the dataset.  
Russia is the most important part of the story shown in Figure 9. Russia’s 
competition law enforcement activities bear little resemblance to the rest of the world. For 
example, Russia had an arresting 89% share of the world’s total Abuse of Dominance 
investigations closed with remedy in 2010. While the United States closed 2 dominance 
investigations with remedies and the European Commission closed 4 in 2010, Russia 
closed 1,453 dominance investigations with remedies that year. Russia similarly remains an 
outlier when compared to other emerging economies: Brazil closed 1 dominance 
investigation with a remedy that year while India, China, and South Africa closed 0, 0, and 
2, respectively. While abuse of dominance investigations is the area where Russia is the 
most notable outlier, Russia is also active in other areas of enforcement. For instance, it 
prohibited or conditionally cleared 83 mergers in 2010, which represents 26% of all merger 
enforcement action in that category across the world that year. But even that figure pales 
in comparison with the 578 mergers that Russia reported as prohibited in 2009 (for 
comparison, the rest of the world prohibited 224 mergers in 2009).  
In our follow-up research and conversations, the Russian agency offered several 
explanations for their distinctive enforcement patterns. First, Russia relies on competition 
law as a tool to pursue price regulation, which increases the number of investigations. 
Second, the agency also described many Russian product markets as being highly 
                                                
29 The CIS formed when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. At its conception, the CIS consisted of ten former 
Soviet Republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
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concentrated, explaining the need for frequent interventions. 30  Finally, the agency 
confirmed that it deals with many small cases as opposed to focusing on large ones.  
However, these official explanations do not tell the entire story. First, although 
Russia may be using competition law to target highly concentrated domestic markets and 
pursuing small cases, its enforcement efforts also target large international firms. Just last 
year, Russia fined Google $6.75 million for abusing its dominant position by forcing 
retailers to install apps on cell phones using Android software (Grove 2016). Russia’s 
competition agency is also investigating Apple Inc. in a price fixing case (Perlman 2016). 
Second, the regulation and categorization of various anticompetitive activities in Russian 
law and agency reporting is inconsistent with international norms.31 For example, the high 
cartel activity numbers likely include cases that are simply horizontal (non-cartel) 
agreements between competitors or even cases that others would characterize as vertical 
agreements.32 The Russian agency also uses competition law to curb inflation and to 
control prices.33 The Russian concept of abusive behavior also includes many practices 
that do not fit under any standard theory of competitive harm, like initiating abuse of 
dominance investigations for firms accused of “infring[ing on] rights/interests of third 
parties” (Khokhlov 2014, at 34). Third, experts have described Russian competition law 
enforcement as “relentless” and “excessive,” and noted Russia’s tendency to pursue 
objectives unrelated to competition (Girgenson & Numerova 2012). In fact, Girgenson & 
Numerova (2012) argue that the general public is very keen to see the agency go after 
“excessive” prices and supports the use of competition law as an instrument for price 
control. This is particularly true against major Russian industrial players, like Gazprom and 
Rosnef, that operate in politically sensitive industries like agriculture and energy.  
                                                
30 Russia ranked 88th out of 139 countries for “Extent of Market Dominance” and 115th for “Intensity of Local 
Competition” in the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report for 2010-2011, (lower rankings are 
associated with higher levels of competition, e.g., Germany ranks 1st for “Extent of Market Dominance”). See 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf (last visited March 22, 
2018).  
31 New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and Non-OECD Countries, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers No. 1104 ECO/WKP (2013), at 21. 
32 As of 2012, Russia has made a distinction between cartels and other restrictive agreements, narrowing the 
scope of what constitutes a “cartel” (Khokhlov 2014, at 32-33).  
33 OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2011 (Dec 2011). 
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Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have unusually high enforcement levels. In 2010, 
Kazakhstan resolved 49 dominance investigations with remedy, which is over eight times 
more than the United States and the European Union combined. For Ukraine, we were 
not able to obtain data for dominance investigations closed with remedy. But our data 
shows that Ukraine alone opened 621 dominance investigations in 2010, following 614 
and 480 in 2009 and 2008, respectively. The numbers are high for cartel investigations as 
well: Ukraine initiated 272 cartel investigations in 2010 while Kazakhstan initiated 39. 
Although we do not have data on cartel investigations closed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
closed 34 cartel investigations with remedy in 2010. Like in Russia, many of the cases may 
be directed at smaller companies. The Kazak antimonopoly legislation, for instance, allows 
the agency to initiate dominance investigations against companies with market share of 
less than 35%.34  
 
2. Jurisdictions with the Most Enforcement Resources & Activities 
 
Although the huge number of competition investigations initiated by Russia and 
other members of the CIS is perhaps the most surprising trend in the enforcement data, 
there are also a number of small markets that have been unexpectedly active players in 
competition law enforcement. To illustrate this, Figure 10 presents the trends for the five 
countries with the most enforcement resources and activities based on their 2010 data.  
The countries that were best resourced are not particularly surprising—instead, 
staff sizes and budgets appear to correlate strongly with market size. With respect to staff 
size, the United States had the greatest number of staff in 2010 with a combined 1,320 
people working in antitrust enforcement at Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission. Japan had the second highest staff numbers, with 791 people working on 
competition law in 2010, followed by the European Union, Brazil, and Canada with 590, 
425, and 420 staffers working in each agency, respectively.35 With respect to budget, the 
                                                
34 Law No. 144 of the Republic of Kazakhstan (19 Jan. 2001) Concerning Competition and Restriction of 
Monopoly, Art. 14, 16; see also Commercial Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 375 (29 Oct. 2015) (the 
aggregate market share threshold for anti-competitive concerted practice increased from 15% to 35%, liberalizing 
the regulation of smaller market share holding entities).  
35 The median agency had 62 people working at it in 2000 and 56 in 2010. 
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United States also dedicated the most resources to competition law enforcement. The 
combined Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission budget for competition 
enforcement was 288 million USD in 2010. China established its three competition 
agencies in 2008 and immediately vested them with significant budgets. In fact, in 2010, 
the combined budget of Chinese agencies was 220 million USD, which was the second 
highest budget held by any jurisdiction. Following the United States and China, the next 
highest budgetary resources in 2010 were found in Japan (96 million USD), United 
Kingdom (73 million USD), and Australia (59 million USD). These can be compared to a 
median agency budget of 3.3 million USD in 2010. 
Figure 10 also presents trends for the five countries that engaged in the highest 
levels of six types of enforcement activities in 2010. Many of the countries that were most 
active across these different areas of enforcement are large, well-resourced, and established 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, the European Union, Brazil, Germany, and South 
Korea. These are regional leaders that undertake cases that often have an impact far 
beyond their own jurisdiction. However, among the top enforcers we also see some more 
surprising, small agencies, such as Bulgaria, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, and Namibia. There 
can be idiosyncratic reasons for some of these small countries’ high activity levels. 
However, one likely reason is that these are often relatively small (and hence more 
concentrated) markets or geographically more isolated markets that can rely less on 
regulators in large and well-connected economies doing the enforcement for them. 
Competition enforcement may hence be particularly important for these small countries 
dominated by a few large companies that control a substantial part of the economy in 
question (Gal 2003). In other cases, these high activity levels may reflect particular features 
of a country’s law. For instance, the reason Ireland reports such high number of abuse of 
dominance investigations is that the Irish authority reviews every complaint and counts 
that as a new investigation even if the investigation is promptly closed in the absence of 
any anti-competitive concerns. 
   
3. Comparing Merger Review in the United States and the European Union 
 
The United States and the European Union garner the most attention in 
conversations about international competition law (Fox 2010). Many comparative law 
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papers, lectures, courses, and conferences are focused on these two jurisdictions alone.36 
Although one goal of our data collection efforts is to make it possible to look beyond these 
two traditional competition powers and examine how competition law has gone global, 
our data can also be used to exam trends in established jurisdictions like the United States 
and the European Union. To illustrate this point, we conclude by examining an area that 
has been the subject of a great deal of debate over the last several decades: merger review.37 
While the United States has exercised control over mergers since 1914 and adopted 
mandatory merger notification in 1976, the European Union only began to exercise 
authority to review mergers in 1990. Figure 11 illustrates several key trends in merger 
review in the twenty years following the European Union’s adoption of a merger review 
regime. As the first panel shows, from 1990 to 2010, the United States systematically 
received more merger notifications than the European Union. During this period, the 
United States received 2,319 notifications per year on average. In contrast, the European 
Union received 217 notifications per year on average. The greater overall United States 
activity in merger enforcement is likely a function of both deal flow and notification 
thresholds. Not only is there typically greater M&A activity in the United States, the 
baseline for merger review activity—the notification thresholds—differs and hence 
catches somewhat different deals, at least at the margin.38  
However, Figure 11 also shows that the picture looks different when comparing 
the percentage of the notified deals that are subjected to an in-depth review, a conditional 
clearance, or an actual prohibition. On average, 5% of notifications lead to a second 
request investigation in the European Union while only 3% are investigated in depth in 
the United States.39 Similarly, on average, the European Union conditionally clears 6% of 
                                                
36 A notable exception is the scholarly attention China and a few other emerging competition jurisdictions have 
received. See, e.g., Gerber 2010; Hylton & Deng 2007; Williams 2005. 
37 It is important to note that European Union Member States also play an important role in the enforcement of 
competition law in Europe (e.g. Barros et al. 2013), and looking at European Union Commission activity alone 
may undercount competition enforcement taking place across the European Union as a whole.  
38 The United States bases its threshold on merging parties’ assets while the European Union uses revenue as the 
decisive factor, making the overall numbers difficult to compare (Gidley & Paul 2009).  
39 It is worth noting that second stage investigations contain some important differences across jurisdictions. For 
example, in the US, conditional clearances only take place after the second request is issued whereas in the 
European Union the Commission can also clear a merger conditionally in Phase I. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339624 
 23 
the mergers notified while this figure is 1% in the United States. In terms of prohibitions, 
the European Union averages at 0.5% of mergers notified to it while the United States’ 
average prohibition rate is 0.3% a year.  
Given the European Union’s reputation as the world’s most stringent competition 
regime (Bradford 2013), the European Union’s higher relative challenge rate is not a 
surprise. Conventionally, the European Union is portrayed as being less trusting of the 
self-correcting forces of the markets and more confident in the ability of the regulators to 
improve market outcomes. The European Union is also viewed as being more hostile to 
dominant companies, and hence more inclined to restrict mergers that may lead to greater 
dominance. While both jurisdictions recognize that mergers can lead to efficiencies and 
are seen as often agreeing on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers, the European 
Union is more inclined to challenge vertical and conglomerate mergers, which the United 
States presumes as efficient except in rare instances.  
Interestingly, this transatlantic divergence in challenge rates diminished after 2000. 
There could be several explanations for this. For one, in 2002 the United States and the 
European Union agencies signed the “Best Practices” agreement, which sets forth how 
the two authorities can work together to promote cooperation and convergence in their 
merger review processes. 40  Additionally, 2002 and 2004 are considered watershed 
moments in European merger control. In 2002, the European courts departed from their 
traditional, restrained judicial review and, in an embarrassing rebuke to the Commission, 
annulled three Commission merger decisions within a span of five months (Overd 2002).41 
The Commission responded to these setbacks by radically reforming the substance and 
procedure it uses for merger review (Gerber 2003; Vranas-Iveris 2008; Baskoy 2008). This 
process culminated in the adoption of a new merger regulation in 2004.42 These events 
may have contributed to a more restrained review in the second decade even though the 
conditional clearances remained relatively high. Of course, the European Union’s 
                                                
40  US-EU Merger Working Group Press Release IP/02/1591, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger 
Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002). 
41 Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-02585; Case C-440/07 P Commission v. Schneider 
Electric SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-00073; Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13. 
42  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (The EC Merger Regulation) 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1. 
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challenge rate has steadily declined over the course of the two decades and it would be 
difficult to estimate how much can be attributed to any such external shocks as opposed 
to a more gradual shift in the European Union’s policy over time.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
 This paper introduced two new datasets on competition law around the world: the 
Comparative Competition Law Dataset and the Comparative Competition Enforcement 
Dataset. These datasets are freely available for download and formatted for easy use. We 
envision that these datasets can be put to a wide range of uses. For one, they can be used 
to study the diffusion of competition law—or specific components of competition law—
across countries (e.g. the data we collected can be used as a dependent variable). 
Additionally, the data can be used to study the effect of competition policy on things like 
economic growth and development (e.g. the data we collected can be used as an 
independent variable). Moreover, the data can be used to account for competition policy 
and market regulation by scholars studying a range of other topics (e.g. the data can be 
used as a control variable). Finally, these datasets may be of interest to scholars doing non-
quantitative work because they make it possible to quickly look up the provisions of 
(almost) every country’s competition regime. Taken together, we hope these datasets will 
advance the study of competition law specifically and the empirical study of comparative 
law more generally.  
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Figure 5: Comparative Competition Law Dataset – Exempted Industries 
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Figure 9: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Resources & Activity 
   




Figure 10: Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset – Top Players 
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Appendix 1: Jurisdictions in the Comparative Competition Datasets 
Albania Dominican Republic* Kosovo* Romania 
Algeria* Egypt Kuwait* Russia 
Argentina El Salvador Kyrgyzstan* Saudi Arabia 
Armenia Estonia Laos* Senegal 
Australia Ethiopia* Latvia Singapore 
Austria European Union Lithuania Slovakia 
Azerbaijan Fiji Luxembourg Slovenia 
Barbados Finland Macedonia South Africa 
Belarus* France Madagascar* South Korea 
Belgium Gabon* Malawi Spain 
Benin* Gambia* Malaysia* Sri Lanka* 
Bolivia* Georgia Mali Sweden 
Bosnia and Herzegovina German Federal Republic* Malta* Switzerland 
Botswana* Germany Mauritius Syria* 
Brazil Greece Mexico Taiwan 
Bulgaria Greenland Moldova Tajikistan* 
Burkina Faso Guatemala* Mongolia Tanzania 
Burundi* Guyana* Montenegro Thailand 
CAN* Honduras Morocco Trinidad and Tobago* 
CARICOM Hungary Namibia Tunisia 
COMESA* Iceland Nepal* Turkey 
Cameroon India Netherlands Ukraine 
Canada Indonesia New Zealand United Kingdom 
Central African Republic* Ireland Nicaragua United States of America 
Chile Israel Norway Uruguay 
China Italy Pakistan Uzbekistan* 
Colombia Ivory Coast Panama Venezuela 
Costa Rica Jamaica Papua New Guinea Vietnam 
Croatia Japan Peru WAEMU* 
Cyprus Jersey Channel Islands Philippines Yugoslavia 
Czech Republic Jordan Poland Zambia 
Czechoslovakia Kazakhstan Portugal Zimbabwe 
Denmark Kenya Qatar*  
* Only in the Comparative Competition Law Dataset  
** Only in the Comparative Competition Enforcement Dataset  
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Appendix 2: Prior Efforts to Empirically Measure Competition Law 



















first year of 
policy 
79  








Competition law adoption, 
enforcement, competition 
advocacy and institutional 
effectiveness. 













in a Global 
Context 
Number of mergers 
monitored, restructured, 
prevented, or abandoned. 




Policy Works: The 
Effect of 
Competition 
Policy on the 
Intensity of 




Experience in enforcing 
competition law (measured 
by years competition law in 
place). Variable constructed 
with the help of UNCTAD 









the World  
Summaries of competition 
legislation and 
implementation around the 
world. Cross-national raw 
data but no systematic 
metrics collected.  
Binary for 
first year of 
policy 
119 countries 
2007 Hylton, Keith 
& Deng, Fei  
Antitrust Around 
the World: An 
Antitrust Scope Index 
(composite index based on 
2001-2004 102 
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Empirical Analysis 
of the Scope of 
Competition Laws 
and Their Effects  
substantive provisions in 
competition laws (builds on 
2008 Nicholson index, 
developed in 2004) 





Law as Market 
Disciplines 























Composite indicator on the 
"toughness of competition,” 
measured by 13 indicators, 
some measuring competition 
policy, others actual 
competition (relies on 











Ramon & Juan 
Luis Jiménez  
The Drivers of 
Antitrust 
Effectiveness 
13 objective features of 
competition policy across 
four categories: (1) agency 
independence, (2) cartels, (3) 






















Policy (builds on 
2004 FTC 
working paper 
series by the same 
author) 
Antitrust Law Index 
(composite index based on 
substantive provisions in 
competition laws)  
2003 52 
2009 Seldeslachts, Jo  
 
Settle for Now but 
Block for 
Tomorrow: The 
Mergers notified, monitored, 
settled and prohibited. 
1992-2005 28 
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Deterrence 
Effects of Merger 
Policy Tools 





Using Four New 
Indicators 
Indicator consisting of four 
variables: (1) substantive 
content of competition laws; 
(2) degree to which laws are 
based on economic analysis; 
(3) formal independence of 
agency; (4) factual 
independence of agency. 
Data generated via surveys 





















Competition agencies’ annual 
budgets; ratio of economists 
to lawyers employed by 
authority; number of mergers 
notified to authority 
1992-2007 32  









Competition agencies’ annual 













Competition Policy Indicator, 
measuring quality and 
intensity of competition 
policy focusing on agency 
features, resources, activity 
levels, sanctions and quality 
of law in the books. Data 
generated via surveys sent to 
competition agencies.  
1995-2005 13 




The year competition law is 
introduced. 
Binary for 
first year of 
policy 
24  
2013 Petersen, Niels Antitrust Law and 
the Promotion of 
Democracy and 








2013 OECD New Indicators of 
Competition Law 
and Policy in 2013 
for OECD and 
Non-OECD 
Countries 
Competition Law and Policy 
Indicator, which is a 
composite indicator 
measuring (1) scope of 
action, (2) policy in 
substantive areas, (3) probity 
of investigation, and (4) 
competition advocacy Data 
generated via survey sent to 
competition agencies.  
 
2013 49  
2014 Gutmann, Jerg 
& Stefan Voigt 
Lending a Hand 
to the Invisible 
Hand? Assessing 
the Effects of 
Newly Enacted 
Competition Laws 
The year competition law is 
introduced. 













The total number of cartel 
investigations where violation 
found, nationalities of fined 








Resources of the competition 
agencies (budget/staff); 
investigations and remedies 
across various areas of 
enforcement activity. Data 
generated via survey sent to 
competition agencies. 
2001-2017 37 
2018 IMD World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook 
Effectiveness of competition 
legislation. 
Data generated via survey 
sent to executives. 










monopoly policy. Data 
generated via survey sent to 
executives. 
1979-2018 Varies but 
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